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ABSTRACT 
The paper discusses the relation between religion and politics in the Southern Mediterranean 
and its consequences for the democratisation and peaceful co-existence of the different 
confessional communities of the region. Its aims are to draw attention to the mechanisms 
responsible for the perpetuation of an “umbilical cord” between religious and political 
discourse in the region, to highlight the dangers this could mean for Europe’s multicultural 
society model and to propose secularisation and inter-religious dialogue as a tool for the 
acceleration of the democratisation process. 
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The links between religion and identity in the Southern Mediterranean 
Many students of the Southern Mediterranean are intrigued by the close interconnection 
between identity, culture and religion in the geographical space that has witnessed the 
emergence of the three great monotheistic faiths. And even though one may be critical of the 
tendency of several scholars, reinforced by the climate that followed the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001, to refer to theology in order to explain the region’s aspirations or 
shortcomings,
1 it would be superficial to undertake any analysis of the current political, social 
or even economic situation in the Southern Mediterranean without taking into consideration 
the important role religions have played (and continue to play) in the shaping of the identities, 
values and expectations of its peoples.  
The unique links between Islam and the Arab language and culture and those, equally unique, 
of Judaism with the Hebrew language and culture, are a fact acknowledged by even the most 
secular intellectuals.
2 As for the region’s smaller, and less well known in the West, Christian 
component, it is also true that, despite the fact that most of its constituents are today Arabic-
speaking and often highlight their communities’ contribution to Arab cultural life, especially 
during the nahda period,
3 references to the pre-Islamic Coptic, Phoenician, Hellenic or 
Aramaic past are very common in the discourse of their leaders and intellectuals.
4 At the same 
                                                 
1 Jacques Rollet’s (University of Rouen) article in the Belgian newspaper Le Soir of 09 October 2001, 
reproaching French political scientists with neglecting theology because they are too much centred in 
their sociological analysis of the Islamic world is an eloquent example of this tendency. See also the 
article of Francis Fukuyama in Le Monde of 18 October 2001 and the interview of V.S. Naipaul in La 
Libération of 6 December 2001, both viewing “holy war”, intolerance and authoritarianism as inherent 
characteristics of Islam and of Muslim societies. 
2 Michel ‘Aflaq, main theorist and founder of the secular, left-wing, nationalist Ba’th party, thought 
that “The Arab nation has been formed by a great historical experience, the creation by the Prophet 
Muhammad of the religion of Islam and the society which embodied it”. According to ‘Aflaq, who 
was born a Greek-Orthodox Christian, “This experience belonged not only to Arab Muslims, but to all 
Arabs who appropriated it as their own, and regarded it as the basis of their claim to have a special 
mission in the world and a right to independence and unity”. A. Hourani (1991, A History of the Arab 
Peoples, Warner Books, New York, p.405. On the other hand, Izio Rosenman (CNRS) observes that, 
“The Jewish religion  has been throughout the centuries the container of the Jewish identity and 
memory. It is undoubtedly this millenary tradition, rich in ethical experiences, that continues to inspire 
today secular and non-secular Jews, as it inspires a part of the Western World as well”. I. Rosenman, 
“Juifs laiques: du religieux au culturel”, in Panoramiques, Paris, 4
th trimester 1992.  
3 See J-P. Valognes(1994), Vie et mort des Chrétiens d’Orient, Fayard, Paris and T.Mitri, “Qui sont les 
Chrétiens d’Orient”? in Version originale, Paris, April 1998.   T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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time, most Oriental Christians continue to be more open to influences coming from the “co-
religionist” West
5 than their Muslim compatriots.  
It might be tempting, and in fact some succumb to the temptation, to deduce from these 
evident links uniting religions with the three dominant cultures and identities of the Eastern 
Mediterranean, that the region constitutes a “world apart”, untouched by the secular 
tendencies dominating its nearby European neighbourhood and characterised by a unique 
precedence of the spiritual over the profane in all aspects of life.
6 However, Southern 
Mediterranean people are by no means pre-determined to be more spiritual or more religious 
than their Northern neighbours and co-religionists. Religions, ideas and ideologies do not 
exist independently from the people who adhere to them, nor can history be explained by 
theology. A close look at other regions of the planet is sufficient to demonstrate the existence 
of tight links between identity and religion in several peoples. This phenomenon is often due 
to a need for self identity and differentiation from a neighbouring “other”, especially in cases 
where the cultural proximity with this “other” and the competitive relations between the two, 
can seriously challenge the specificity that a community is used to consider as fundamental of 
its own conception of “self”.
7 Identities are in fact social constructions built in order to 
distinguish the “self” from the “other” and thus they do not exist per se but are constantly re-
inventing themselves in a framework of an ongoing interaction with the “other”.
8 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 See for example the interview of Georges Rahmé (Lebanese University) in Solidarité – Orient, Ath, 
July – September 1997, and the covering of the 5
th Colloquium on the “Syriak patrimony” (Lebanon, 
August 1997) in the same issue. C.H. Dagher argues that the “Phoenician” historical and cultural claim 
was the “political embodiment of the national aspirations” of the Maronites “and would span from the 
founding of “Greater Lebanon” (1920) to the post-independence years and even until the onset of the 
troubles” (the Lebanese civil war) C.H. Dagher (2000), Bring Down the Walls: Lebanon’s Post-War 
Challenge, St. Martin’s Press, New York, p. 21. See also X. de Planhol (1997), Minorités en Islam, 
Flammarion, Paris, on the tendencies for political autonomy in the past amongst the Maronites and the 
Copts. 
5 According to Professor Selim Abou, rector of the famous St. Joseph University of Lebanon, “For 
Christians, Western civilisation, even in its most secular aspects, remains the inevitable depository of 
their anthropological and spiritual references”. C.H. Dagher, op. cit., p. 23.  
6 “Religion is present on this land, it is present in the mentalities, in the traditions, in the collective 
reactions, more than elsewhere” writes Gabriel de Broglie in the preface of the acta of the colloquium 
“Le facteur religieux dans les conflits du Moyen-Orient” (Fondation Singer-Polignac, Paris, 1999). 
Such an approach is not solely adopted by Western scholars or commentators. Many among the 
spiritual leaders of the three dominant religions of the Eastern Mediterranean take pride in this “central 
role religion plays in society – in shaping, developing and advancing society”, to quote Dr. Habib 
Badr, Pastor of the National Evangelical Church of Beirut (“Divinity, Diplomacy and Development”, 
unpublished manuscript). For several of them, one of the basic points critically differentiating the 
Southern from the Western coast of the Mediterranean is respect for religion and religion-based 
traditions: see S. Radi, “L’image de l’Occident chez les prêcheurs Musulmans et Coptes”, Egypte – 
Monde Arabe, Cairo, 2
nd and 3d trimester 1997. 
7 The link between the Arab identity and Islam, for example, can be compared with the one connecting 
Roman Catholicism to the Polish and the Irish identity, both forged in an historical context dominated 
by a more powerful and culturally close neighbour (the Russians and the English). Other historical 
conditions presenting a number of similarities with those that connected Islam and Judaism to the 
Arab and Hebrew people’s conception of self-identity during the process of nation-making, are those 
that led to the linking of Greek-Orthodoxy to the Hellenic or the Russian identity. 
8 See for example the classical work of F. Barth (1969), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Little, Brown 
and Co., Boston.  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
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A religion-based political discourse 
Notwithstanding the above, it is difficult to deny that religion, as a constitutive element of 
identity, has unavoidably been and continues to be an important component of the conflict(s) 
dividing the people of the Southern Mediterranean. At the same time, it is also true that after a 
period of relative absence, a religion-based discourse, often quite radical, has made a 
spectacular comeback in the regional political scene, especially after the success of the Iranian 
Islamic revolution of 1979-80 and the failure of the secular-minded socialist, Ba’thist or 
Nassirist regimes to fulfil their promises for development, social justice and restoration of 
national dignity, traumatised by the Arab defeats of 1948-49
9 and 1967. This comeback of 
religion has coincided with a reverse of the (already weak) democratic acquis and the 
sclerosis of regimes in several of the Southern Mediterranean states
10 without certainly being 
the exclusive reason of this evolution. More recently, the frustrations caused by the second 
Gulf War and the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process that followed it, along with 
the continuing socio-economic shortcomings of the region, have gained new audiences for 
political groups claiming a (more or less) fundamentalist religious adherence, and have further 
accentuated the centuries-old tendency of local authoritarian regimes to use religion as a 
means of legitimisation.
11 
In Europe, and in general in the West, a lot has been written since the beginning of this 
sacralisation of political discourse in the Southern Mediterranean in order to explain the 
phenomenon and to attempt an evaluation of its possible evolution.
12 In the following pages, 
we will try to highlight some of the less-often mentioned mechanisms that perpetuate the 
maintenance of an “umbilical cord” between identity and religion in the region; to stress the 
impact this link has in local social and political life and in Europe; and to discuss possible 
ways to use religion as a factor of democratisation and regional integration. 
                                                 
9 The 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war is still referred to by many in the Arab world as “Al-Nakba”, the 
disaster. 
10 Political evolution in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and even Turkey can provide 
several examples of the above. Georges Corm, former Lebanese Minister of Finances, argues that the 
Iranian revolution, “called religious”, has paradoxically served to cement for a period the authoritarian 
Arab regimes, too scared by the subversive power of the Khomeinist ideology (see G. Corm, 1997), Le 
Proche-Orient éclaté – II, La Découverte, Paris, pp. 34-44.  
11 Thus for example, at the level of symbols, the very secular Saddam Hussein has added the phrase 
“God is the greatest” on the Iraqi national flag, whilst the political discourse on Palestinian liberation 
is becoming the more and more “Islamised” (see for example: Le Monde Diplomatique, March 2001 ). 
The fundamentalist views defended by some of the religious parties in Israel and the use of a radical 
discourse by some of the leaders of the Christian communities (notably the Coptic one) prove that the 
phenomenon concerns all the national / religious/ cultural families of the region and is not limited to 
its Islamic constituent.  
12 It would be impossible to mention here all that has been written on the “comeback” of religion in 
Arab and Israeli societies and especially on the emergence of a radical political Islamic discourse. We 
believe however that it is interesting to note that not all of this literature adopts a pessimistic view of 
this evolution. Some of its (Western) analysts have in fact considered the phenomenon as fertile, as an 
indispensable step towards modernity (see F. Burgat (1995), L’islamisme en face, La Découverte, 
Paris), whilst for some others, the re-Islamisation of Muslim societies is viewed as a culturally 
different way to reach modernity (see, for example, L. Binder (1988), Islamic Liberalism: A Critique 
of Development Ideologies, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, and J.L. Esposito (1995), The 
Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?, Oxford University Press, Oxford).  T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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Most of the analysts of the interaction between religion and politics in Europe’s Southern and 
South-eastern border,
13 have identified three elements as the principle cause for the (re-) 
emergence of religion as a key player on local political scenes:  
•  The failure of the region’s secular regimes to combat corruption and ensure decent socio-
economic conditions of life for their growing populations;
14 
•  The excessively authoritarian nature of several of these regimes, in the context of which 
religion becomes a means of legitimisation for the rulers whilst providing at the same time 
the most important if not the only available space of freedom for the ruled; 
15 and 
•  A feeling of “collective loss of dignity”
16 due to the humiliation and marginalisation of the 
Arab world after its repeated failures to assist the Palestinian cause.  
At the same time, the ongoing frustration due to the lack of security within the Israeli borders, 
and the fear of persecution due to the rising popularity of movements calling for the 
establishment of Islamic governments based on the shari’a, could be proposed as (non-
exclusive) causes of the re-sacralisation of the Jewish and Oriental Christian political scenes 
respectively.
17 
Notwithstanding how pertinent such analysis might be with regards to the causes of the 
repositioning of religion in the centre of the regional political debate, it is important to keep in 
view the fact that Judaism, Islam and Christianity have always been used in the history of the 
Mediterranean as banners in order to mobilise energies and people, legitimise expansions and 
wars and boost community loyalties.
18 Being in the very heart of the fundamental myths of 
                                                 
13 We are referring of course here to those who have not opted for a theological explanation of the 
phenomenon. 
14 Burhan Ghalioun eloquently refers to this failure of the secular Arab regimes as “la modernité 
trahie”: B. Ghalioun (1997), Islam et Politique, la modernité trahie, La Découverte, Paris. In his 
recent book on Islam and modernity, Bernard Lewis observes that “these regimes have failed every 
test except survival” (!), B. Lewis (2002), What Went Wrong? The Clash between Islam and 
Modernity in the Middle East, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, p. 158. 
15 See for example the interesting article of Fethi Benslama (Université Paris VII) in Le Monde of 28 
November 2001, in which the author denounces the manipulation of religion by the ruling families of 
the wealthy Gulf monarchies in order to perpetuate authoritarian forms of government in the Arab 
world. Also see G. Corm, op. cit. 
16 G. Corm, op. cit., p. 205. 
17 The crucial importance of the religious parties in the Israeli political scene and the raise of the 
importance of religious leadership within the Maronite and Coptic communities are some of the most 
visible effects of the re-sacralisation of these communities’ political life. 
18 In his very controversial work The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel 
Huntington observes that “from its origins Islam expanded by conquest and when the opportunity 
existed Christianity did also. The parallel concepts of “jihad” and “crusade” not only resemble each 
other but distinguish these two faiths from other major world religions” (S. Huntington (1998), The 
Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, Touchstone, London, p. 211). Judaism on the 
other hand has served as a rallying cry for all the combats of the Hebrew nation, eloquently described 
in the Bible, for the conquest of the “Promised Land”. It has also been extensively used by the 
secularist Zionists in the struggle for the (re)creation of the State of Israel. Zeev Sternhell (The 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem), observes in fact, that, even though Zionists have tried to translate 
Jewish specificity into political and modern (secular) terms, they were still based on a Jewish national, 
historical, religious identity, in a framework where liberal universalism or Marxism had no 
significance. Sternhell argues that Zionism is primarily a cultural nationalism, “a nationalism with 
religious connotation, where secularism has always been very superficial. This explains why the  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
 5 
the Arab, Jewish and at a lesser extent Christian
19 constituents of the local mosaic, religion 
was in fact the surest means to ensure wide support for causes that rarely had anything to do 
with spiritual issues.
20 The Southern Mediterranean has never in fact experienced movements 
similar to the great philosophical and revolutionary changes that reshaped dramatically the 
nature of relations between religion and identity and religion and politics in Europe and the 
West.
21 
The millet system 
Ruled by the Ottoman Empire,
22 most of the region has lived until practically the end of 
World War I
23 under a unique system of government, the basis of which were “nations” 
(millets) defined by their religious affiliation. Members of each of these millet were governed 
by their own religious leaders and laws/traditions as regards to all matters touching their 
personal and family status, and were enjoying a broad communal autonomy in exchange for 
their allegiance to the state and their acceptance of the dominant position of the Muslim 
community (millet – I hakime’), along with the limitations and discriminations that this 
dominant position meant for their own status as citizens/subjects.
24 
The impact of this system, which was applied without interruption for several centuries in the 
biggest part of the Southern Mediterranean,
25 is still immense in most of the countries that 
                                                                                                                                                          
symbiosis of secular with religious Zionism has seemed to be so natural”, J. Lenglet-Ajchenbaum & 
Y-M. Ajchenbaum(2000), Les Judaismes, Gallimard, Paris. 
19 Pre-Christian past (Pharaonic Egyptian, Assyrian, Phoenician) is still quite present in the 
fundamental myths of the Coptic, Syriak-Chaldean and Maronite communities respectively. 
20 A. Hourani, op. cit. argues that, “Whether they lived within the Ottoman Empire or outside its 
frontiers, those who professed faith in Islam and lived through the medium of the Arabic language had 
something in common which was deeper than political allegiance or shared interests. Among them, 
and between them and those who spoke Turkish or Persian or the other languages of the Muslim world 
there was a common sense of belonging to an enduring and unshaken world created by the final 
revelation of God through the Prophet Muhammad”. 
21 The Renaissance, the Lumières, socialism, Marxism and the French and Russian revolutions had 
only a very limited effect in North-African and Middle Eastern societies and states. See B. Lewis 
(1995), The Middle East: 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, pp. 305-331. 
22 Exactly like the medieval European states, and its own predecessor, the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) 
Empire, the Ottoman State was officially proclaiming itself to be a religion-based entity, “with the 
God-given duty of maintaining and applying the Holy Law and extending the area in which it 
prevailed”. B. Lewis (1995), op. cit., p. 305. 
23 Western-inspired attempts to modernise the Ottoman State, such as the Tanzimat, or the (quite 
secular) constitution of 1876 had only a very relative and short-lived success. 
24 B. Lewis (1995), op. cit., pp. 321-322. Besides the Muslim, the Christian (Greek-Orthodox) and the 
Jewish were the most important of the millets of the Empire. The successive divisions of the Christian 
communities, however, mainly due to the missionary activity of the Roman Catholic Church (assisted 
by Western powers) among the Oriental Christians, led to the establishment of new millets in order to 
franchise the members of the “uniate” churches from the authority of the Greek-Orthodox Patriarch.  
25 As well as in the European provinces of the Empire. It is interesting to note that the article 42 of the 
Lausanne Treaty (1923) guaranteeing family and personal status law “in accordance with the customs 
of (the) minorities” is still applying with regards to the Muslim minority of Western Thrace (Greece), 
making the latter the only community within the EU borders that still lives under the millet system! 
See Th. Koutroubas (2001), Trapped in Enemy Territory or Pilots towards Regional Integration? A  T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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emerged from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. With the notable exception of the 
Empire’s most direct successor, the secular Republic of Turkey,
26 variations of the millet 
system continue to apply nowadays in the majority of South-Eastern Mediterranean States, 
including Israel.  
In practice, and in the framework of the local mosaic-like societies, the millet’s direct 
consequences are: 
•  The establishment of inflexible frontiers between religion-based communities;  
•  The embodiment of religious authorities with a concrete judicial power over their folk; 
and 
•  The perpetuation of sectarian loyalties within the society and the functioning of religion 
itself as the hard core of exclusive identities.  
Thus, the system constitutes a major obstacle towards the implementation of a common 
concept of citizenship based on civic values and encourages the persistence of traditional and 
potentially conflict-generating forms of identity perception
27 as well as clientelistic relations 
between community and state leaderships. It is obvious that such a system, besides 
contributing to the further sacralisation of political discourse, leaves very little, or no space at 
all for the dissemination of ideas contradicting sectarian “orthodoxies” or considering religion 
in general to be a spiritual and private matter rather than a community and political adhesion. 
Religious leaderships and political discourse 
Vested with powers that far exceed their spiritual authority, religious leaderships in the region 
are thus called (and are expected) to play a particularly important role at the social and 
political level. However, with the exception of the Christian communities, which are 
traditionally organised on a hierarchical basis topped by a clergy and, in most cases, by a 
supreme head centralising loyalties and guaranteeing the uniformity and the “orthodoxy” of 
the Churches’ teaching and public discourse, neither the Muslim nor the Jewish communities 
recognise clerics or other leaderships with a claim to a “sacred” legitimacy.
28 ‘Ulama and 
rabbis are in fact considered to be simple students and interpreters of the Holy Law without 
any sacerdotal functions. And even though some among them, like the Imam of the famous 
Al-Azhar Islamic University of Cairo or the Grand-Rabbis, are enjoying a broader recognition 
for the “orthodoxy” of their religious views and judgements by the community, their authority 
                                                                                                                                                          
Challenge for Democracy in the South Eastern Mediterranean Region, European University Institute 
Working Papers, RSC No. 2001/19, Badia Fiesolana, San Domenico. 
26 Officially secular, the Turkish Republic continues however to exercise a very active control over 
ministers of religion and reserves itself the right to veto the investiture of the leaders of its religious 
minorities.  
27 Goncourt award-winner Lebanese author Amin Maalouf calls this reduction of identity to one of 
adherence as a result of the confessional millet system of “deadly identities”. He argues that this 
concept “installs human beings in a partial, sectarian, intolerant, dominating and often suicidal 
attitude, frequently transforming them into murderers or partisans of murderers…Their vision of the 
world is biased and distorted”, A. Maalouf (1998), Les Identités Meurtrières, Grasset, Paris, p.26. 
28 Judaism had a hierarchically organised clergy until the second destruction of the Temple and the 
suppression of the Jewish revolt by the Roman emperor Adrian (132-135 Common Era). For some 
scholars, the hierarchical organisation of the Iranian Shi’a ‘ulama, especially after the establishment of 
the position of supreme spiritual leader by the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, can be compared 
to that of a clergy. The abolition of the caliphate by Kemal Ataturk in 1924, deprived Sunni Islam of 
its only remnant of a personalised supreme authority.  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
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cannot be compared with that of the Christian bishops who possess concrete administrative 
and sacerdotal power over their fellow clerics and faithful. 
In the case of Islam, practice has proved, at least in the years following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, that this lack of a “sacred” authority, instead of facilitating the evolution of 
religion into a personal, intimate spiritual conviction, coupled by a never-ending effort to 
seize its most profound meanings (ijtihad), as many say it was meant to do,
29 has instead 
turned it into an easy prey to all kind of authoritarian regimes in need of legitimisation, thus 
facilitating its manipulation for political purposes. This absence of a central authority holding 
the power to define religious “orthodoxy” and to sanction “heretical” discourse, makes it in 
fact impossible to credibly and authoritatively legitimise the labelling of any exegesis of the 
Koranic message as false, notwithstanding how fundamentalist this exegesis might be. 
Political opposition groups have quickly understood the rallying force that religion could 
represent in such a context. At the same time, local governments lacking democratic 
credentials are using the fundamentalist views of religious-minded political movements as an 
excuse in order to reinforce their control of the nominations of Muslim preachers
30 and to put 
their sermons and explanations of the holy law at the service of their own strictly profane 
political causes.  
It is interesting to note here that this instrumentalisation of Islam is not without consequences 
for Europe, where Muslims constitute today one of the largest religious communities, mainly 
resulting from immigration. The reluctance of European governments to provide Islam with a 
legal framework similar to that applying to the other religious communities within their 
borders
31 and the lack of institutions of Islamic theological formation in Europe, have enabled 
Northern African and Middle Eastern authorities to extend their control of religious teaching 
over Muslim communities in the old continent.
32 At the same time, this absence of a Europe-
based (and Europe-minded) Islamic religious infrastructure has also paved the way for 
supporters of fundamentalist approaches of religion, the teachings of whom contribute to the 
continuation of the European Muslim communities’ social marginalisation.
33 The multiple 
socio-economic issues facing immigrant communities are of course a major cause of the 
vulnerability of a number of Western Muslims to religion-based radical discourse. 
                                                 
29 See for example B. Ghalioun, op. cit., pp. 197-208. 
30 The programme launched by the Egyptian government in 1993 in order to prevent Islamists from 
using mosques for the propagation of their ideas is an example of this tendency. In the framework of 
this programme, a law was adopted in order to make it illegal to preach without the authorisation of 
the Ministry for Religious Affairs. This action was severely criticised by many ‘ulama, who noted that 
traditionally no one needs an authorisation to preach in the Muslim community (see S. Radi, op. cit.). 
31 A reluctance probably due to the thought that the presence of Islamic communities was provisional, 
their members expected to return to their homelands after a period of working as immigrants. See T. 
Ramadan, “Les musulmans du Vieux Continent sortent de l’isolement”, in Manière de Voir 48, Le 
Monde diplomatique, November-December 1999.  
32 See for example Le Monde, 30 November 2001, for a description of the attempts of the Moroccan 
and Algerian governments to continue their control over French Islamic communities after the 
decision of the French government to create a single body, the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, 
to represent Islam to the public authorities. 
33 See for example the interview of the Mufti of Marseilles, Soheib Bencheikh, in International Herald 
Tribune of 30 November 2001, in which he denounces the influence of Islamic fundamentalist groups 
over Muslim institutions in France, where “the vast majority of the Muslim community is committed 
to integration into French society on the basis of respect and understanding.”  T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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On the other hand, the extreme fragmentation of the Christian communities made them also 
easier to control and manipulate in the context of millet-like systems and/or authoritarian 
regimes, despite the highly hierarchical organisation of most of them. And in this case, 
experience has proved that the modern character of the general provisions of the majority of 
the regional constitutions, guaranteeing freedom of religion and equality of rights for all 
citizens, did not prevent the persistence of millet practices, such as the right of the State to 
name, confirm or revoke the investiture of religious authorities.
34 Directly answerable to the 
State, Christian leaderships have to constantly prove their loyalty, and that of their 
community/Church, to the government, in order to maintain their communities’ internal 
autonomy and their own State-granted position and privileges. Furthermore, the re-
sacralisation of political discourse, the popularity of movements claiming the establishment 
of theocratic regimes (with all this signifies for religious minorities) and the need of several 
regimes to “prove” their religious loyalties as a reaction to the above, has not been helpful for 
the evolution of minority rights in general in the region. This situation has also accentuated 
the tendency of several Christian leaderships to provide more secular-minded authoritarian 
regimes with unconditional support, considering them to be less dangerous for their 
communities’ interests than their fundamentalist opponents.
35 At the same time, the 
guarantees that the perpetuation of millet-like systems provide for the privileges and the 
authority of religious leaders as incontestable community heads made several of them 
reluctant to work for the system’s change,
36 and that despite the fact that State 
confessionalism and segregation on the basis of religious beliefs are officially denounced by 
“sister” churches in the West.  
It is worth noting that in the past Europe had often used these communities as an excuse in 
order to acquire economic and political privileges and influence in the region.
37 These 
                                                 
34 The current refusal of the Israeli government to recognise the investiture of Irinaios I as Patriarch of 
the Greek-Orthodox, Arab-speaking community of Israel, Jordan and the Occupied Territories more 
than one year after his election, despite the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of this election by all 
Greek-Orthodox Churches world-wide and by the Jordanian and Palestinian Authority governments, 
illustrates the persistence of such practises even within the most democratic Southern-Mediterranean 
states. It is interesting to note that in many countries of the region, Israel and Turkey included, the 
government also reserves the right to approve the list of eligible candidates for a position of supreme 
religious leader. 
35 The speeches of the Patriarch of the Chaldean Church, Mgr. Rafael Bidawid, representing the 
biggest Christian community in Iraq, before, during and after the second Gulf war, are eloquent 
examples of the above: “Your media have demonised him (Saddam Hussein). They have not 
understood his psychology nor that of the Iraqi people. This man is seeking the good of his country 
and of the Arab world. …(Freedom of religion) is better guaranteed in our part of the world than in 
yours (the West). What rights remain to the believers in Europe, where divorce, abortion and 
homosexuality are encouraged? Iraq is a secular State. Our leader (rais) goes to the mosque with his 
court (sic), but he is of Christian origin”!! Le Vif/L’Express, 20 March 1998.  
36 Pleading for the maintenance of confessionalism in Lebanon, the rector of St. Joseph University, 
Selim Abou, a Roman Catholic priest himself, argues, for example, in favour of a “differentiated 
citizenship”, based on individual freedom, the equality of citizens and, last but not least “the 
institutional recognition of the citizens’ communal and cultural affiliations” as opposed to a uniform 
citizenship. C. Dagher, op. cit., p. 23. 
37 For a detailed history of Europe’s relations with these communities, see J-P Valognes, op. cit. Often 
secular at home, European powers have played the card of protection of Christian co-religionists in the 
Southern Mediterranean in order to acquire economic control within the Ottoman space. The 
ceremonial links of several European consulates in Jerusalem with the local Christian authorities are  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
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interventions of European powers in the Middle East officially aiming to protect Oriental 
Christians have discredited the latter in the eyes of their Muslim compatriots and have 
generated distrust and even violence between religious communities.
38 Today, several among 
the Southern Mediterranean Christian intellectuals are warning against the negative 
consequences the Western-born movement to demand reciprocity of treatment between 
Muslims in Europe and the Western World on one hand and Oriental Christians on the other 
hand, would have for the latter, in a socio-political context marked by the rise of 
fundamentalism and the politicisation of religious discourse.
39 At the same time, the intensive 
and increasing efforts of North American fundamentalist Christian movements to influence 
US foreign policy in favour of Israel risk discrediting Oriental Christians in the eyes of their 
Muslim compatriots, further deepening religion-based hatred in the region.
40 
Mainly now limited to Israel, the Jewish communities of the Southern Mediterranean
41 do not 
face the same problems regarding state control and censorship of religious ministers as their 
Islamic and Christian counterparts. However, the (non-secular) Israeli state continues to apply 
the millet system exactly as inherited by the Ottoman Empire and conserved during the British 
mandate
42 with all the above-described consequences this form of socio-political organisation 
has for inter-community relations, state-church dynamics, and democracy itself.
43 At the same 
time, and despite of the existence of several progressive schools of thought within 
contemporary Judaism,
44 religious affairs in Israel regarding the Jewish community are 
                                                                                                                                                          
nowadays amusing relics of this era, specially in what regards the religious obligations of the Consul 
of the very secular (and often anti-clerical) French Republic! See Le Monde of 16 November 1999.  
38 See Y. Courbage & Ph. Fargues (1997), Chrétiens et Juifs dans l’Islam arabe et turc, Payot, Paris, 
pp. 170-181.  
39 See for example, T. Mitri, “Justice, Droits de l’Homme, Dignité nationale: Un enjeux pour les 
Chrétiens et les Musulmans dans le monde”, in Musulmans et Chrétiens, Politiques d’Accueil dans les 
Terres d’Origine et d’Immigration, Bajad, Paris, 1999. 
40 See Bertrand Dufourcq in the acta of the colloquium “Le facteur religieux dans les conflits du 
Moyen-Orient”, op. cit. 
41 One of the consequences of the creation of the State of Israel was the almost complete 
dismantlement of North African and Middle Eastern Jewish communities who used to be particularly 
prosperous and creative in the years before World War II. According to Y. Courbages & Ph. Fargues, 
op. cit., pp. 262, these communities represent today the 56% of the population of Israel.  
42 See J. Algazy, “Ces hommes en noir en Israel”, in Manière de Voir 48, Le Monde diplomatique, 
November-December 1999. See also J-P Valognes, op. cit., p. 575. 
43 In an interview published in Le Soir of 9 April 1998, Knesset member Azmi Bishara, an Arab-
Israeli, describes the absurd situations such a confession-based system can create: “And me, a 
‘Christian’, an atheist, I must discuss in the Knesset the issue of who can be considered a Jew, which 
law on conversion is the best… Theology, but theology that determines who can become an Israeli 
citizen.” The Nazareth mosque issue, related to the permission granted by the Israeli authorities to 
Nazareth Muslims for the construction of a mosque in a site very close to the Marian shrine venerated 
by the Catholic Arabic community of the city, is an eloquent example of the perverse dynamics 
between state and religious communities created by a millet-like system. In the context of the tension 
this decision of the Israeli authorities has generated between Muslims and Christians in Nazareth, the 
leaders of all Christian communities in the country have denounced the government’s authorisation to 
build the mosque as an attempt to divide Israeli-Arabs over confessional issues. See Le Monde, 25 
November 1999.  
44 Notably those of Reformed and Conservative Judaism, to which belongs the majority of the 
numerous American Jewish community. See J. Lenglet-Ajchenbaum & Y-M. Ajchenbaum, op. cit., 
pp. 256-262.  T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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administered by the ultra-conservative orthodox rabbinate. The latter stands for a very 
exclusive definition of Judaism and uses its public authority in order to condone practises 
aiming to give the state a completely theocratic character, and to encourage discrimination 
against “heretical” Jews and non-Jewish citizens alike.
45 The rise of the importance of 
political parties claiming adherence to radical forms of Judaism and the use of religious 
discourse by state authorities in order to support national causes,
46 proves that despite the 
incontestable exercise of democratic freedoms severed elsewhere in the region, the state of 
Israel does share the same problems with the rest of the Southern Mediterranean as regards 
the rise of religious fundamentalism and the sacralisation of political discourse. This general 
sacralisation of political discourse in the region, in the context of sectarianism, inter-
community animosity and mistrust characterising millet-based societies, is further embittering 
the ongoing violent conflict between Israelis and Palestinians since the launching of the 
second intifada,
47 thus weakening chances for its resolution.
48 
A threat for Europe 
The recent increase of violent incidents between religious and ethnic communities in the 
West, especially after the events of September 2001 and the escalation of horror in the Middle 
                                                 
45 See J. Algazy, op. cit. The long battle (11 years) of women for the right to hold group services at the 
Western Wall (under official regulation, carrying a penalty of up to six months in prison, they were 
only allowed to pray there individually), and the reactions provoked among the orthodox religious 
establishment by the Israeli Supreme Court’s decision to grant this right, is an eloquent example of 
how influential the position of the orthodox rabbinate can be within the state of Israel. See 
International Herald Tribune, 23 May 2000.  
46 The welcoming speech of Israeli President Weizman to Pope John-Paul II during his official visit to 
Tel Aviv in March 2000 is an example of the tendency of Israeli secular authorities to use religious 
discourse in order to support national causes: “Many generations have passed since the beginning of 
our people’s history, yet they seem to us like a short time. Only 200 generations since the emergence 
on the stage of history of a man called Abraham who left his home and native land and went to a place 
which is today this, my country. Only 150 generations have passed from the pillar of the fire that 
signalled the redemption of the Exodus from Egypt until the pillars of smoke that signalled the 
destruction of the Holocaust. Your Holiness, you are arriving this evening in Jerusalem, the city of 
peace, the capital of the State of Israel… it is the city of the judges of Israel, the kings of Israel and the 
prophets of Israel, the capital and source of pride of the State of Israel”. See the web site of the 
Franciscan Custody of the Holy Land (www.custodia@netvision.net.il). 
47 It is significant that even the name of the second intifada (Al-Aqsa) has a strong religious 
connotation (the “Dome of the Rock”, one of the major holy shrines of the Muslim religion). See Le 
Monde diplomatique, March 2001, op. cit.  
48 Yasser Arafat’s frequent references to the second intifada as a jihad (see for example International 
Herald Tribune of 13 November 2000, “Arafat Extols ‘Noble Cause’ of Holy War”) and the 
declarations of Israel’s public authority-vested chief rabbis forbidding the giving up of Israeli 
sovereignty over the Temple Mount (International Herald Tribune, 5 January 2001), are examples of 
the impasse such a sacralisation of the conflict leads to. See also the interesting article of Mouna 
Naim in Le Monde of 14 October 2000, in which the author argues that the sacralisation of the 
conflict doesn’t serve any of the parties involved because it makes difficult the discussion of the 
strictly political causes of the intifada. Supporting this view, the former Minister of Finance of 
Lebanon and well known analyst of the region Georges Corm fears that “The religious and mystical 
Muslim and Jewish exaltation directly leads both populations to suicide”, Le Monde, 23 May 2001.  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
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East,
49 has unfortunately proved that the situation in the region is not without consequences 
for the European secular multicultural societies.  
Terrorist attacks and images of atrocities in the Occupied Territories are contributing to 
cement mutual stereotypes that have been nourished by centuries of competitive, often 
conflictual co-existence and by a mutual ignorance of the other. Despite their long history of 
interaction, religious and cultural communities of the two sides of the Mediterranean are in 
fact still quite ignorant of the fundamental values and beliefs of their neighbouring “other”.
50 
In Europe, such stereotypes are actively promoted and manipulated by the extreme right-wing 
or populist parties who find in them an easy way to multiply their electorate. Besides the 
evident danger the raise of popularity of these parties represents for European democracies, 
their xenophobic and anti-Islamic
51 discourse is further cementing anti-Western feeling 
among Muslim communities in Europe and elsewhere, thus creating a potentially explosive 
vicious cycle. On the other side of the Mediterranean at the same time, and in Europe itself in 
mostly its Muslim immigrant community, preachers from all three confessional families of 
the region
52 and groups claiming a religious adherence, advance and propagate such ideas, 
reinforcing them with theological vocabulary and religion-based arguments. 
The characteristics of public discourse of both European extreme-right wing politicians and 
Southern Mediterranean preachers or self-proclaimed “men of religion”, and the reasons 
pushing this public to give credit to their discourse, have been the object of extensive analysis 
during the last years. However, it is interesting to point out that, even in the European context, 
where the propagation of hatred and racism is often punishable by law, intolerant or hateful 
discourse is much more difficult to contain when it is pronounced under the coverage of 
religion and/or by religious ministers, and this because of the evident difficulties to clearly 
define the limits of the freedom of religion. 
                                                 
49 It is interesting to note that inter-community violence in Europe is often targeting places of worship 
or religious ministers.  
50 See for example S. Hanafi, “La Mise en Cause Conjoncturelle de l’Occident” and J-N Ferrié, 
“Usage et Petits Usages de l’ ‘Occident’ en Egypte”, in Egypte Monde Arabe, op. cit. The indifference 
of Western publishers to works on Islam written by Muslim Middle Eastern authors is an example of 
the persistence of ignorance on the other side (International Herald Tribune, 18 October 2001, 
“Islam’s Books Go Unread in the West”). See also the preface of Marcello Pacini (The Giovani 
Agnelli Foundation) in the issue of Egypte Monde Arabe, op. cit., and J-N Ferrié, “Les Visions de 
l’Occident dans le Monde Arabe”, in the Egypte Monde Arabe, op. cit., on the mechanisms that 
generate stereotypes about the West in Southern Mediterranean societies.  
51 Often also anti-Semitic. 
52 See S. Radi, op. cit. In this very interesting comparison of the sermons of Muslim ‘ulama and 
Christian Coptic priests in Egypt, Saadia Radi (CEDEJ, Cairo) observes that religious ministers from 
both confessions are accusing the West in their sermons of a lack of respect for religion, immorality, 
sexual promiscuity and a distorted use of liberty. It is worth noting that, according to S. Radi, sermons 
from priests and ‘ulama are almost identical when it comes to denouncing the defaults of Western 
civilisation. In Europe, police and secret service inquiries launched after the shock of the September 
11, 2001 attacks and the discovering of links between fundamentalist groups and the terrorist networks 
in many countries of the Union, have recently revealed that preachers have been inciting their 
congregations to intolerance and even violence in numerous mosques in the UK, the Netherlands and 
Italy. (See The Economist, 10-16 August 2002).  T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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From a means for division to a factor of unity in diversity 
As was demonstrated by the above, the sacralisation of political discourse, the politicisation 
of religious sermon and the persistence of antiquated confession-based forms of social 
organisation in the Southern Mediterranean on the one hand, combined with negligence in 
providing a modern legislative and institutional framework for the Islamic communities in the 
West on the other, have contributed to turn religion into a major factor of division, intolerance 
and conflict, both in Europe and in its Northern African and Middle Eastern neighbours. This 
manipulation of religious teachings and discourse goes hand-in-hand with the perpetuation of 
authoritarianism and the rise of fundamentalism in the Southern Mediterranean, as well as 
with the marginalisation of Muslim and in general immigrant communities and the rise of 
extreme right-wing parties in the West. The use of religious discourse by the authors of the 
terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 in the United States has dramatically highlighted the 
catastrophic consequences the sacralisation of political issues can generate for world peace, 
democracy and in fact the Western way of life.
53 
Conscious of that, different bodies within the European Union are studying ways to revive the 
parts of the Barcelona process of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership
54 relating to democracy, 
human rights, culture or the civil society,
55 whilst several European countries are reviewing 
ways to deal with Islam as an organised religion within their borders.
56 At the same time 
numerous religious leaders, intellectuals and decision-makers are launching various initiatives 
aiming to promote better understanding between confession or culture-based groups and to 
                                                 
53 The mistrust that the attacks have created in the West towards the Muslim community was rejected 
by a considerable number of intellectuals in Europe and the West who have denounced the 
demonisation of this community and have called for better understanding between confessional 
groups. See for example the article of Umberto Ecco in Le Monde of 10 October 2001, the interview 
of Edward Said in El Pais of 2 December 2001, or the contribution of Jean-Noel Ferrié (CEDEJ) and 
Baudouin Dupret (CNRS) in Le Soir of 23 October 2001, entitled “Le déni de commune humanité” 
and that of Robert Malley (The Council of Foreign Relations, US) in International Herald Tribune of 
12 October 2001, with the eloquent title “ Look harder: Violence Isn’t Islamic and Islam Isn’t 
Violent”.  
54 Barcelona Declaration adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference - 27-28/11/95, available from 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm. The site in question also contains 
a wealth of information on the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. 
55 The Declaration provides for the setting-up of a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. To 
this end, the signing parties have reaffirmed that “dialogue and respect between cultures and religions 
are a necessary precondition for bringing the peoples closer”, and they have expressed “their intent to 
promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respecting the cultural identity of each 
partner, and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes”. The partners have 
also undertaken “to adopt measures to facilitate human exchanges, in particular by improving 
administrative procedures”. These provisions have unfortunately been among the less implemented of 
the Declaration. 
56 The creation in 1998 of a single official body (Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique) in order to 
represent the Muslim community of Belgium vis-à-vis the federal authorities, recognise imams and 
teachers of religion, etc., and the establishment of an analogue body in France (Conseil Français du 
Culte Musulman) in 2001, are examples of the recent effort of European governments to create 
conditions for the emergence of a “local” Islam, less dependent on foreign input.  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
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emphasise the call for peace and brotherhood present in all the three monotheistic sacred 
books.
57 
Notwithstanding the fact that the result of these actions and those of the Barcelona process 
regarding democracy and human rights, are rather limited and, in the case of inter-religious 
dialogue, relevant only to a small group of intellectuals, such initiatives constitute a step in a 
good direction.
58 The ambition (and necessity) to “turn the Mediterranean basin into an area 
of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity”,
59 
requires in our view, not only “sustainable and balanced economic and social development, 
(and) measures to combat poverty”,
60 but also a real effort to re-organise Southern 
Mediterranean societies on a non-confessional basis, hand-in-hand with a strengthening of 
democracy and respect for human rights. We argue in fact that democracy and respect of 
human rights cannot flourish in societies based or segregated on the basis of confessional 
affiliation, where state authorities are tempted to draw legitimacy from theology and not from 
the freely expressed public approval of their political programmes, where the (only sometimes 
existing) opposition is also tempted to use religion-based discourse and exegesis instead of 
political argument, and where religion means belonging by birth to exclusive sectarian 
communities in constant unease with each other and not freely chosen adhesion to a faith 
and/or a set of moral values.  
Breaking centuries-old forms of social organisation and defining new limits between the 
religious and the profane is certainly not an easy task. In the previous century, several of the 
countries of the region experienced attempts of secularisation from above.
61 However, the 
top-down scheme and the superficial character of such attempts, along with the authoritarian 
nature of their political initiators, have quickly compromised their chances to succeed. 
Furthermore, the maintenance (and often strengthening) of state control over religious affairs, 
and the partial (and often unfair for religious minorities) application of the reforms,
62 have 
contributed to the discrediting of the concept of secularisation in the eyes of the public, who 
                                                 
57 See for example: Conseil Pontifical pour le Dialogue Interreligieux (1998) and Le Dialogue 
Interreligieux dans l’Enseignement Officiel de l’Eglise Catholique (1963-1967), Editions de Solesmes, 
Paris, for a full collection of all Holy See documents and Papal speeches on inter-religious dialogue. 
Less than a month after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, an Islamic-Christian Summit for Peace 
was organised in Rome, at the initiative of the lay Roman-Catholic community of Sant’Egidio (Le 
Monde, October 7-8 2001). The latter is one of the most active organisations for the promotion of 
understanding between confessional communities. See also the works of Michel Lelong, a Catholic 
priest, highlighting the community of values between Christianity and Islam (for example: M. Lelong 
(1991)  De la Prière du Christ au Message du Coran, Tougui, Paris), and the yearly review 
Islamochristiana, published in Rome by the Pontificio Instituto di Studi Arabi e d’Islamistica.  
58 The initiation of a Christian-Jewish dialogue and the sincere efforts of the Roman Catholic Church 
since the Second Vatican Council to eradicate anti-Judaism among its ranks have, for example, 
considerably improved relations and mutual conceptions of the “other” between these two 
communities. See H. Tinq (1993), L’Etoile et la Croix, JCLattès, Paris. 
59 Barcelona Declaration, op. cit. 
60 Barcelona Declaration, op. cit. 
61 Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey is the most often-used example of such a secularisation attempt. Syria, 
Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria have also experienced, to a lesser extent, some form of a state-imposed 
secularisation. 
62 Even though it is undoubtedly the most secular of the Southern Mediterranean states, Turkey offers 
such an example of state control over religious affairs and unfair application of the secularisation 
reforms (regarding its Christian communities). See J.P. Valognes, op. cit., pp. 810-832.   T HEODOROS KOUTROUBAS 
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associated it with its initiators and their broken promises of progress, freedom and prosperity. 
This experience of the past saw that in order to take roots in society, secularisation should go 
hand-in-hand with a general programme of democratisation, stressing respect for human 
rights, effective exercise of fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. It is important to note 
here, that religion-inspired ideas do not need to be excluded from such a secularisation 
process. The successful co-existence of European Christian-democratic parties with secular 
socio-political systems can be a fruitful example of how persons of strong religious 
convictions can make an enriching contribution to the progress of modern societies without 
changing the a-confessional character that constitutes one of the major warrants of citizens’ 
equality in the eyes of the law.  
In such a context, we believe that it would be productive to propose as examples (always 
bearing in mind that no society is identical to another and consequently there can be no one-
fits-all paradigm) some of Europe’s own models of secularisation, especially those taking into 
consideration the historical role a specific religion has played in the making of the nation.
63 
Proposing Europe’s own experiences as a potential source of inspiration for secularisation and 
democratisation in the Southern Mediterranean could be combined with actions for raising 
awareness about the values and ways of life prevalent among the peoples of the Union, in an 
effort to combat ignorance-based stereotypes and promote understanding and productive co-
existence.  
These actions could take forms such as:  
•  Educational seminars targeting different society groups (youth, students, pensioners, 
women, teachers and trainers, etc.);  
•  Conferences and workshops aimed at the academic and/or the broader public;  
•  Reading material and schoolbooks;  
•  Mutual exchange programmes at various levels; and 
•  Mass media-covered debates and information programmes.  
Initiatives and actions like the ones mentioned above should ideally involve regional partners 
such as institutes of education, municipalities, organisations of the civil society, public 
administration staff and interest groups. Citizens of Southern Mediterranean states residing in 
Europe should also be targets of projects like the ones mentioned above. In their case, and in 
the case of their compatriots who have already acquired European nationality, the credibility 
of the actions will highly depend on the improvement of the general socio-economic 
conditions of their lives and the containment of xenophobic or racist discourse and political 
groups. In parallel, awareness-raising programmes on the historical experience, the multiple 
realities and the values of the Southern Mediterranean peoples could contribute to combat 
prejudices and xenophobia among European populations, thus limiting the effects of extreme 
right-wing or populist political discourse.  
At the same time, Europe should encourage initiatives analogous to those above in order to 
improve understanding, support civil society organisations promoting secular views, and build 
trust between the three cultural families of its southern and south-eastern border. The role of 
                                                 
63 In a number of European countries such as the Netherlands, the Scandinavian states or Spain, the 
maintenance of some ceremonial references to the religion historically connected to the making of the 
nation (i.e. the constitutional obligation of the monarch to profess a specific religion, etc.) has 
probably made easier the acceptance of secularisation of the state by conservative public members 
without having any significant effects on the results of the general de-sacralisation process.  S ECULARISATION, INTER-RELIGIOUS DIALOGUE AND DEMOCRATISATION 
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the Union at that level should however be much more discreet. In order to become credible 
and acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public, trust-building initiatives between 
local communities need to come from local bodies without a too obvious “Western” 
encouragement.  
Having recognised that “dialogue and respect between cultures and religions is a necessary 
precondition for bringing the peoples closer”,
64 the Union could further encourage inter-
religious dialogue initiatives. This dialogue could in fact assist the efforts to de-sectarianise 
Southern Mediterranean societies by contributing to raise awareness among religious 
authorities and confessional communities in the region on the state of freedom of religion and 
the conditions under which confession-based communities and institutions operate in the 
European secular context. Bringing inter-religious dialogue to the faithful by means of 
initiatives at the level of the local church mosque or synagogue could help eradicate religion-
based prejudices, and render fundamentalist and radical views less credible. In the context of 
the ongoing and ever-escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, the spread of 
religious dialogue initiatives and the active engagement of religious leaders to the cause of 
peace and justice could be an effective means to limit the use of theological discourse for the 
support of intransigent political positions and prevent an inflammation of feelings in the wider 
Arab-Islamic world against the West, often perceived as a monolithic Judeo-Christian 
whole.
65 At the same time, such actions should stress the important role religion can play in 
the development of the Southern Mediterranean after the achievement of peace and the 
progressive de-sacralisation of conflictual discourse. For centuries in fact, the important 
flows of pilgrims from all three monotheistic communities world-wide had functioned as a 
permanent stimulant for tolerance, collaboration and peaceful, often-productive, co-existence 
in a land widely recognised as being “Holy” and occupying a privileged place in the hearts of 
many. 
Transforming religions again into a factor of collaboration for development through tourism, 
investments and education (and thus into a major job-creating force), and giving the region a 
vocation of permanent inter-faith dialogue laboratory for world peace is not so unrealistic an 
ambition. We believe that it is certainly a cause worth trying to achieve. 
                                                 
64 Barcelona Declaration, op. cit. 
65 It is interesting to note in this context that the efforts of John-Paul II to prevent the second Gulf War, 
his repeated positions against the embargo on Iraq and the sympathy he has demonstrated for the 
Palestinian cause have contributed to prevent the degeneration of the anti-Western and anti-American 
feeling widespread in the region into a general anti-Christian feeling. Such an evolution would have 
been particularly explosive for the European multi-confessional, multicultural societies counting a 
considerable number of Muslim faithful, and for Oriental Christians, easily suspected to sympathise 
with their Western co-religionists. The high appreciation the Pope enjoys in the Muslim world can be 
demonstrated by the number of Islamic countries (almost all) who have established diplomatic 
relations with the Holy See. At the same time, Vatican initiatives such as the Pope’s acknowledgement 
of the Catholic Church’s weaknesses during the horrible times of the Shoah, or his visit to Israel and 
his repetitive calls in favour of the Hebrew State’s right to live in peace within its internationally 
recognised borders had a positive effect on Christian-Jewish relations both in Europe and in the 
Southern Mediterranean. The success of inter-religious dialogue in promoting peaceful co-existence 
and understanding in this case must be considered in comparison with the negative effects the 
continuation of hatred spread by preachers of all three major religions in the region still has in the 
framework of the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. CENTRE FOR
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